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A1.a.  Households 
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() t Ch is the consumption aggregate.  We assume Cobb-Douglas preferences: 
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1
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 In  turn,   and   are CES aggregates over a continuum of goods 
produced in each country: 
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() t Nh is an aggregate of the labor services that the household sells to each of a 
continuum of firms located in the home country: 
(A4)  . 
1
0 () (, ) tt Nh Nhfd f =∫
  Households receive wage income,  , aggregate profits from home 
firms,  .  They pay lump-sum taxes each period,  .  Each household can trade in a 
complete market in contingent claims (arbitrarily) denominated in the home currency.  
The budget constraint is given by: 
() () tt WhNh
t T t Γ
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where   represents household h’s payoffs on state-contingent claims for state  (, )
t Dh∇
t ∇ .  
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 occurring at time t. 
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 In  this  equation,   is the exact price index for consumption, given by:  t P
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Ht P  is the Home-currency price of the Home aggregate good and   is the Home 
currency price of the Foreign aggregate good.  Equation 
Ft P
(A6) follows from cost 
minimization.  Also, from cost minimization,  Ht P  and   are the usual CES aggregates 
over prices of individual varieties, f: 
Ft P
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1
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  Foreign households have analogous preferences and face an analogous budget 
constraint. 
Because all Home households are identical, we can drop the index for the 
household and use the fact that aggregate per capita consumption of each good is equal to 
  1 
the consumption of each good by each household.  The first-order conditions for 
consumption are given by:  
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In equation (A11), we explicitly use an index for the state at time t for the purpose of 
clarity.    is the normalized price of the state contingent claim.  That is, it is 
defined as   divided by the probability of state 
1 (|
tt Z
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1/ t R , where  t R  denotes the gross nominal yield on a one-period non-state-contingent 
bond.  Therefore, taking a probability-weighted sum across all states of equation (A11), 
we have the familiar Euler equation: 
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  Analogous equations hold for Foreign households.  Since contingent claims are 
(arbitrarily) denominated in Home currency, the first-order condition for Foreign 
households that is analogous to equation (A11) is: 
(A13)  .  ()
*1* * * 1
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Here,   refers to the home currency price of foreign currency exchange rate. t E
1     
As noted above, we will assume at this stage that labor input of all households is 
the same, so  .  () tt NN h =
A1.b.  Firms 
 Each  Home  good,   is made according to a production function that is linear 
in the labor input.  These are given by: 
() t Yf
(A14)  .  () () tt t Yf A Nf =
Note that the productivity shock,  , is common to all firms in the Home country.   
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1 We offer an apology to the reader here.  We want to stick to CGG’s notation, who use   for the log of 
the nominal exchange rate.   Consistency requires us to use   to refer to the level of the nominal exchange 
rate, so we have used the distinct but similar notation 
t e
t E
t Ε  to be the conditional expectation operator. 
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where the technology parameter,  t η , is stochastic and common to all Home firms.    
  Profits are given by: 
(A16) 
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In this equation,   is the home-currency price of the good when it is sold in the 
Home country.    is the foreign-currency price of the good when it is sold in the 
Foreign country.    is aggregate sales of the good in the home country: 
() Ht Pf
* () Ht Pf
() Ht Cf
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* () Ht Cf  is defined analogously.  It follows that  .   
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  There are analogous equations for  , with the foreign productivity shock 





t η , and foreign subsidy 
given by 
*
t τ . 
A1.c   Equilibrium 
  Goods market clearing conditions in the Home and Foreign country are given by: 
(A18) 
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We have used   and   to represent the price of imported to locally-produced goods in 
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Equations (A11) and (A13) give us the familiar condition that arises in open-
economy models with a complete set of state-contingent claims when PPP does not hold: 
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  Total employment is determined by output in each industry: 
(A23)  ( )
11 11
00 () () tt t t t H t H t H t NN f d f A Y f d f A C V C V
−− == =+ ∫∫
* *


























⎝⎠ ∫ f . 
A2  Price and Wage Setting 
 
Households are monopolistic suppliers of their unique form of labor services.  Household 
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  The first-order condition for household h’s choice of labor supply is given by: 
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The optimal wage set by the household is a time-varying mark-up over the marginal 
disutility of work (expressed in consumption units.)   
Because all households are identical, we have  () tt WW h =  and 
  m equation ): 
28) 
 
t the following notation.  For any variable : 
() tt NN h = . 
Since all households are identical, we have fro  (A27
(A
1(/ 2 ) /( 1 )
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σφ μ
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  We adop   t K
  K    is the value under flexible prices.  t
  t K  is the value of variables under globally efficient allocations.  In other words, 
is is th
lexible Prices 
ms maximize profits given by equation (A16), subject to the demand 
rve (
th e value for variables if prices were flexible, and optimal subsidies to 
monopolistic suppliers of labor and monopolistic producers of goods were in place.  This 
includes a time-varying subsidy to suppliers of labor to offset the time-varying mark-up 
in wages in equation (A27).   
 
F
  Home fir
cu A10).  They optimally set prices as a mark-up over marginal cost: 
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  When optimal subsidies are in place: 
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From (A27), (A29), and (A30), it is apparent that the optimal subsidy satisfies  
(A31) 
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Becaus
(1 )(1 )(1 ) 1
PW
tt τμ μ −+ += . 
e the demand functions of Foreign residents have the same elasticity of demand 
for Home goods as Home residents, firms set the same price for sale abroad:  
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  We assume a standard Calvo pricing technology.  A given firm may reset its 
prices with probability 1 θ −  each period.  We assume that when the firm resets its price, 
it will be able to reset its prices for sales in both markets.  We assume the PCP firm sets a 
single price in its own currency, so the law of one price holds.   
The firm’s objective is to maximize its value, which is equal to the value at state-
contingent prices of its entire stream of dividends.  Given equation (A11), it is apparent 
that the firm that selects its price at time t, chooses its reset price,  , to maximize 
0 () Ht Pf
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subject to the sequence of demand curves given by equation (A10) and the corresponding 
Foreign demand equation for Home goods.  In this equation, we define 
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  Under the Calvo price setting mechanism, a fraction θ  of prices remain 
unchanged from the previous period.  From equation (A7), we can write: 
(A39) 
1/(1 ) 10 1
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  The same environment as the PCP case holds, with the sole exception that the 
firm sets its price for export in the importer’s currency rather than its own currency when 
it is allowed to reset prices.  The Home firm, for example, sets P  in Foreign 
currency.  The firm that can reset its price at time t chooses its reset prices,   and 
, to maximize 
* () Ht f
0 () Ht Pf
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The solution for   is given by:   





































We find for export prices,  






































 Equation  (A39) holds in the LCP case as well.  However, the law of one price 
does not hold.  For export prices, we have: 
(A43) 
1/(1 ) ** 1 0 * 1
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Subsidies 
  As in CGG, we will assume that subsidies to monopolists are not set at their 
optimal level except in steady-state.  That is, instead of the efficient subsidy given in 
equation (A31), we have: 
(A44)  .  (1 )(1 )(1 ) 1
PW τμ μ −+ + =
Here, 
W μ  is the steady-state level of 
W
t μ .  We have dropped the time subscript on the 








In this section, we present log-linear approximations to the models presented 
above. 
  In this section, we present all of the equations of the log-linearized model, but we 
separate out those that are used in the derivation of the loss function (which do not 
involve price setting or wage setting) and those that are not. 
 
Equations used for derivation of loss functions 
We define the log of the currency misalignment as the average of the difference 
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In the flexible-price and PCP models,  0 t m = . 
  We also define the export premium as the average by which consumer prices of 
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  In all three models, to a first order, 




.  That 
allows us to approximate equation (A23) and its foreign counterpart as: 
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  The market-clearing conditions, (A18) and (A19) are approximated as: 
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  The condition arising from complete markets that equates the marginal utility of 
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For use later, it is helpful to use equations (B5)-(B7) to express  ,  ,  , in terms of  t c
*
t c t s t y  
and   and the price deviations,   and  . 
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And, solving for the terms of trade, we find: 
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=− + + . 
  Under a globally efficient allocation, the marginal rate of substitution between 
leisure and aggregate consumption should equal the marginal product of labor times the 
price of output relative to consumption prices.  To see the derivation more cleanly, we 
insert the shadow real wages in the efficient allocation,  tH wp t −  and 
**
t wp − F t  into 
equations (B18) and (B19) below.  So, the efficient allocation would be achieved in a 
model with flexible wages and optimal subsidies.  These equations then can be 
understood intuitively by looking at the wage setting equations below ((B22)-(B23), and 
(B24)-(B25)) assuming the optimal subsidy is in place.  But, to emphasize, they do not 
depend on a particular model of wage setting, and are just the standard efficiency 
condition equating the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and aggregate 
consumption to the marginal rate of transformation.   
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Equations of wage and price setting 
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We can express  , and   in terms of  tH wp − t F t
**
t wp − t y  and 
*
t y  and the exogenous 
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  We can solve for the values of all the real variables under flexible prices by using 
equations (B3), (B4), (B10), (B11), (B16), (B22) and (B23), as well as the price-setting 
conditions, from (A33): 
(B24)  ,  tH t wp a −=    t
*
t (B25)  . 
**
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PCP 
  Log-linearization of equations (A38) and (A39) gives us the familiar New 
Keynesian Phillips curve for an open economy: 
(B26)  1 () Ht t Ht t t Ht wp a π δβ π + =− − + Ε, 
where  (1 )(1 ) / δ θβ θ =− − θ . 
  We can rewrite this equation using (B22) and (B18) as: 
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LCP 
 Equation  (B26) holds in the LCP model as well.  But in the LCP model, the law 
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In addition, from (A42) and (A43), we derive: 
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 Consider  equations  (B29)-(B33).  If  0 t z =  in these equations, 
then
*
Ft Ht Ft Ht
* π πππ −=−.  This in turn implies  1 t z + 0 = .  By induction, if the initial 
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condition   holds, it follows that  0 0 z = 0 t z =  in all periods in the LCP model, or, in other 
words,  .  That is, the relative price of Foreign to Home goods is the same in both 
countries.  We emphasize that this is true for a first-order approximation in the LCP 
model. 
*
t ss =− t
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Relationship to CGG’s Phillips Curve 
  The Phillips curve in CGG’s PCP model has Home inflation depending only on 
the Home output gap.  Our model should be equivalent to theirs when there is not home 
bias in preferences, but equation (B27) has  Ht π  depending on both   and  .  This will 
not reduce to a function only of 
R
t y  
W
t y  
t y    except in the case of  1 σ = .  
  However, it can be seen that in fact (B27) is equivalent to CGG’s equation when 
one recognizes that CGG’s definition of the output gap differs from the one used here.  
CGG define the output gap as the difference between  t y  and what I will call 
CGG
t y .  
CGG
t y  
is the efficient level of Home output when the Foreign output level is taken as given.  
That contrasts to our definition in which  t y  is the globally efficient output level.  CGG’s 
definition is convenient because their analysis focuses on non-cooperative monetary 
policy, while the definition used here is more convenient because of the focus on 
cooperative monetary policy.  But this is a matter of convenience: algebraically the 
equations are the same. 
  To see this, note that equation (B26) is the same as in CGG.  When there are no 
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. 
Substituting this expression into equation (B26) gives us CGG’s version of the Phillips 
curve, in which inflation depends only on the Home output gap under their definitions. 
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Appendix C 
 
C.I  Derivation of Welfare Function in Clarida-Gali-Gertler model with Home 
Bias in preferences 
  The object is to rewrite the welfare function, which is defined in terms of home 
and foreign consumption and labor effort into terms of the squared output gap and 
squared inflation.  We derive the joint welfare function of home and foreign households, 
since we will be examining cooperative monetary policy. 
  Most of the derivation requires only 1
st-order approximations of the equations of 
the model, but in a few places, 2
nd-order approximations are needed.  If the 
approximation is 1
st-order, I’ll use the notation “ ( )
2 oa + ” to indicate that there are 2
nd-
order and higher terms left out, and if the approximation is 2
nd-order, I will use 
“ (
3 oa + ) ”.  (a is notation for the log of the productivity shock) 
From equation (A1), the period utility of the planner is given by: 
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1* 1 1* 1 11
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  Take a second-order log approximation around the non-stochastic steady state.  
We assume allocations are efficient in steady state, so we have 
1* 11* CC NN
σ σφ −− + == =
φ + 1 .  The fact that 
1 CN
σ φ − + =  follows from the fact that in 
steady state,   from market clearing and symmetry, and  CN = CN
σφ − =  from the 
condition that the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption equals 
one in an efficient non-stochastic steady state.  
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Since we can equivalently maximize an affine transformation of (C2), it is convenient to 
simplify that equation to get: 
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22
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Utility is maximized when consumption and employment take on their efficient values: 
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max * * 2 *2 2 *2 3 11
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  In general, this maximum may not be attainable because of distortions.  We can 
write  ttt x xx =+   , where  tt t x xx ≡−   .  So, we have: 
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. 
  We can rewrite this as: 
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The object is to write (C7) as a function of squared output gaps and squared 
inflation if possible.  We need a second-order approximation of  .  But because 
the rest of the terms are squares and products, the 1
st-order approximations that have 
already been derived will be sufficient.   
22
W
t cn −   
W
t
 Recalling  that  in the PCP model, we can write equations  0 t m = (B14)-(B15) as: 
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  Next, we can easily derive: 
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(C15)  ()
2 WW
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These follow as in (B3)-(B4) because  ( )
2
tt t nya o a =−+  and  tt nya t = −  (and similarly 
in the Foreign country.)   
  We need expressions for 
R
t n  and 
W
t n .  We have, using (B18)-(B19): 
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  Turning attention back to the loss function in equation (C7), we focus first on the 
terms 
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t n .  We can substitute from equations (C10)-(C17) into this expression.  It is useful 
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  Now return to the   term in equation  22
W
t cn −    (C7) and do a 2
nd-order 
approximation.  Start with equation (A18), dropping the 
1 k
−  term because it will not 
affect the approximation, and noting that in the PCP model, 
*1
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Then we get this 2
nd-order approximation: 
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Now we can take a 1
st-order approximation for   to substitute out for  .  From equation  t s
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Substituting into equation (C26), we can write: 
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Evaluating (C27) at flexible prices, we have: 
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See section C.3 below for the second-order approximations for   and  :  t n  
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This expression reduces to CGG’s when there is no home bias ( 1 ν = ).  To see 
this from their expression at the top of p. 903, multiply their utility by 2 (since they take 
average utility), and set their γ  equal to ½ (so their country sizes are equal.) 
 
C.2  Derivation of Welfare Function under LCP with Home Bias in Preferences 
  The second-order approximation to welfare in terms of logs of consumption and 
employment of course does not change, so equation (C6) still holds.  As before, we break 
down the derivation into two parts.  We use first-order approximations to structural 
equations to derive an approximation to the quadratic term  
() () ( ) ()
22 22 (1 ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) 2(1 ) 2(1 )
R W R W RR WW RR RR
t t t t tt tt tt tt c c n n cc cc nn nn σφ σ φ −+ − ++ + −+ − ++            
. 
  Then we use second order approximations to the structural equations to derive an 
expression for  .  22
WW
tt cn −   
  The quadratic term involves squares and cross-products of  ,  , 
R
t c  
W
t c  
R
t c , 
W
t c ,  , 
, 
R
t n  
W
t n  
R
t n , and 
W
t n .  Expressions (C10)-(C11) still gives us first-order approximations for 
R
t c and 
W
t c ; equations (C14)-(C15) are first-order approximations for   and  ; and, 
R
t n  
W
t n  
(C16)-(C17) are first-order approximations for 
R
t n  and 
W
t n .  But we need to use 
equations (B14)-(B15) and (C10)-(C11) to derive: 
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  With these equations, we can follow the derivation as in equation (C18).  After 
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.  Note that the last term involves 
output levels, not output gaps.  That is, we have: 
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  The derivation of   is similar to the PCP model.  However, one tedious 
aspect of the derivation is that we cannot make use of the equality   that holds 
under PCP and flexible prices.  We write out the equilibrium conditions for home output, 
and its foreign equivalent, from equations 
22
W






(A18) and (A19): 
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  We directly take second-order approximations of these equations around the 
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Averaging (C39) and (C40), we find: 
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Next, we can use equations (B14)-(B17) to get approximations for  ,  ,  , and 
.  These equations are linear approximations for  ,  , , and  , but since we are 
looking to approximate the squares of these variables, that is sufficient.  With some 
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Note that if set   and  0 t m = 0 t z =  in (C42), we would arrive at the second-order 
approximation for   from the PCP model. 
W
t c
  Then following the derivations as in the PCP model derivation of (C29), we can 
write: 
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  We then can substitute (C43), and (C44), along with (C36) into the loss function 
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C.3  Derivations of Price Dispersion Terms in Loss Functions 
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By the definition of the price index  Ht P , we have 
1 ˆ (1 ) ( )
0 1
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ξ − = ∫ .  Hence, from (C49), 
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Note the following relationship: 
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Using our notation for variances,  , and taking the log of 
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Substituting this into equation (C47), and recalling that  ttt y na = + , we arrive at equation 
(C30).  The derivation of (C31) for the Foreign country proceeds identically. 
For the LCP model, we will make use of the following second-order 
approximation to the equation  : 
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Taking a second-order log approximation to 
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  Following analogous steps for the Foreign country, 
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Adding (C62) and (C63) gives us equation (C44). 
  Finally, to derive the loss functions for policymakers, we note that the loss 
function is the present expected discounted value of the period loss functions derived 
here (equation (C33) for the PCP model and (C45) for the LCP model.)  That is, the 
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Following Woodford (2003, chapter 6), we can see that, in the PCP model, if 
prices are adjusted according to the Calvo price mechanism given by equation (A39) for 
Ht P  that 
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Analogous relationships hold for   in the PCP model, and for 
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the LCP model.  We can then substitute this relationship into the present value loss 
function,  , to derive the loss functions of the two models presented 
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It follows that  
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The second equality follows because, under Calvo pricing, to a first order 
.  The third equality follows because 
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42
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= .  Then substitute (C66) into (C65) to 
get the simplified loss function presented in the paper.  
Appendix D 
 
  The model is closed with equations for monetary policy.  This appendix solves the 
model algebraically when there are no cost push shocks and labor supply elasticity 
parameter, φ , is set to zero.  These solutions can be used to derive the impulse response 
functions in Figure 1 of the paper. 
  We also assume for simplicity that the foreign productivity shock is zero.  (Since 
the model is symmetric, the solution for the response to foreign productivity shocks is 
straightforward.)   
  We assume the Home productivity shock follows the AR1 process given by: 
  1 tt aa t ρ ε − =+ ,   1 0 tt E ε − = . 
D.1  PCP model 
  With no mark-up shocks, the Phillips curves, (B27) and (B28) simplify to: 
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  The optimal targeting rules can be written as: 
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Since  , these two equations solve for actual Home and Foreign output. 
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  To calculate impulse responses for the exchange rate, we have, setting  1 0 t a − = , 
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D.2 LCP Model 
  Under LCP, we can write the Phillips curves as: 
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  The targeting rules are: 
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  Assuming at time period -1 all variables are at their efficient levels, these 
equations immediately imply that  0
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tt ππ = = , which imply 
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R
























=    . 
Note also that since  , we have  0
W
t y =  
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  The deviation of the relative price of imports from the efficient level is given by 
.  The evolution of   in turn is determined by the expectational difference 
equation: 
tt ssa =−   t
t
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  This equation has the solution 
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However, recognizing that  (1 )(1 ) / δ θβ θ ≡− − θ , we see that these solutions simplify to: 
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  To get impulse responses, with some algebra, we can show, setting   and 
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  It follows immediately from (D13) that 
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Setting   and  , we can get impulse responses from this equation:  1 0 t a − = 1 0 t s − =  
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